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PREFACE
Roy Gutman has reported on national security issues for Newsday's Washington bureau for
the past seven years. For eleven years prior to that, he was a Reuters correspondent in
Washington, Britain, West Germany, and Yugoslavia. Mr. Gutman has published articles
in Foreign Service Journal, Foreign Policy, and the Washington Post. He is also the author
of the critically acclaimed book, Banana Diplomacy: U.S. Policy in Nicaragua 1981-1987
(1988). He has a B.A. in history from Haverford College and a M.S. in international
relations from the London School of Economics.
This paper was presented at the Seventh Annual Journalists and Editors Workshop
on Latin America, on April 7, 1989.
Richard Tardanico
Editor
Occasional Papers Series Dialogues

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: A NEW APPROACH TO LATIN AMERICA?

Eleven weeks ago, at his Senate confirmation hearings, James Baker laid out the Bush
administration's foreign policy agenda. The highest concern of the new administration was
the survival of democracy in Latin America. Foreign policy, Baker said, begins at home.
It must be rooted in our values.

It gathers its strength from how well we do with our

immediate neighbors. Second on the U.S. agenda was our links with Western Europe and
with our trading partners on the Pacific rim. Third priority went to global problems such
as narcotics, terrorism, and the environment. U.S. relations with the Soviet Union came
fourth and the Arab-Israeli dispute arrived in a distant fifth place along with other regional
disputes.
The order of his presentation received less attention than it deserved.

Those who

noticed it were puzzled. When you consider the tangle of its politics, the economic and
social mire of so many countries, and the no-win nature of so many of its problems, why
would anyone set such a priority on Latin America? Baker, Bush, and Scowcroft, moreover,
are pragmatic types and political animals, people who like winning, not the existential
reward of struggle--like you and me. Certainly, Carter-style idealism or moralism was not
at work here either.
One answer lies in the transition period.

Not only did the experts in both parties,

ranging from Sol Linowitz to George Fauriol, produce intelligent, thoughtful papers to the
transition but to a very large degree they converged in their advice. Bush and Baker also
had an unusual amount of exposure to Latin views. The president-elect traveled to Houston
to meet Mexican president-elect Salinas de Gortari.

Carlos Andrks Pkrez visited

Washington. Azcona and Alfonsin also visited. David Rockefeller sat down with Bush for
a fair spell of time in mid-December. All gave a reinforcing message: crisis is looming.
Clean up the policy mess in Central America. Get an early start.
In mid-February, as Baker left on his first trip to Europe, Latin experts who, for the
most part, had managed to contain their expectations breathid a sigh of relief. The only
thing worse than no attention to the region was too much attention and too hurried or
unconsidered an approach. And when American Middle East diplomacy kicked off a few
weeks ago with Moshe Arens's visit to Washington, it was more evidence of business as
usual.
We can now conclude that Baker had laid out his true intentions on January 17. To
a remarkable extent he has followed through.

Perhaps he was just making a virtue of

necessity. But of necessity there was plenty.
Nicaragua was the single most divisive issue of the previous administration and the
one that had caused the most grief for U.S. diplomacy internationally.

A draft report

prepared by the General Accounting Office summed up the policy. It said U.S. goals were
confused. At times they are geared toward a destabilization of the Sandinista government.
At times toward establishing a more pluralistic system within the Sandinista framework.
Little success has been achieved in either objective. American economic sanctions, it said,
had not reduced government power, but were forcing the educated middle class and the
potential opposition leaders out of the country. The United States, it said, had taken a very
visible and bilateral approach to Nicaragua, allowing the Sandinistas to characterize this as
a confrontation between a Latin state and U.S. imperialism. The Sandinistas also had used
U.S. sanctions and aid to the contras as a pretext for their economic failures, for restrictions

of civil liberties, and for the size of the militaries.

This analysis came from a group of

accountants who don't usually look into foreign policy.
In going to Congress with his own new approach, Baker has made it clear that he
accepts the verdict not only of the GAO but also of the leaders of the region:

due to

Ronald Reagan's obsession with military overthrow of the Sandinistas, the United States had
virtually dealt itself out of the diplomatic game during Reagan's last year and a half. Baker
has made that point since in talking with Congress. The conclusion was inescapable after
the February 14 summit at Tesoro Beach.

I was with Baker on his whistle-stop tour of NATO. While he was soliciting the
support of NATO allies to condition their financial aid to Sandinista democratic reforms,
the Central Americans got the commitments we wanted without telling us what they were
doing. For two days he did not comment. He felt he had been blindsided. Baker does
not like to be blindsided. At one point, a member of his inner circle asked me if I could
explain the dynamic that led to that agreement.

You know reporters have virtually no

access to the usual sources when traveling on that plane. Just imagine if you are secretary
of state, have every source and resource known to man and can't figure it out. Something
had to be done.
The other shoe fell just two weeks later. What better demonstration could there have
been of the economic pressures on the region's fragile democracies than the riots in
Venezuela, the most sable democracy in South America, and a country that had introduced
reforms sought by the United States and the IMF.
To give the administration credit, and I think it is due, they not only saw things
coming but in the case of debt made it an urgent priority. You could not have asked for

I

I

~

an earlier response than the Brady plan, announced within five weeks of inauguration. It
has its inadequacies, particularly concerning the amounts of debt that are to be forgiven, but
as a vehicle addressing the problem in a timely way and for gathering a consensus, it has
certainly had an impact.
Politically and diplomatically, it took a little longer to organize--more than forty hours
of negotiations by Baker with Congressional leaders over three weeks, particularly with Jim
Wright and other Democrats. The upshot was equally timely and precedent setting as the
Brady plan. The Baker initiative centered on obtaining another year of non-lethal aid for
the contras, but paid the price by throwing U.S. support for the first time behind regional
efforts at democratic reforms and peaceful settlement to include, in language that papered
over political differences, the removal of the contras from Honduras.
I should make an observation or two about the way Baker works, based on this

particular incident. He is an able negotiator and he likes to work in secrecy. He surrounds
himself with old hands from his previous jobs, but it isn't clear yet just what their role is.
He puts enormous personal energy into his endeavors. He defined this particular problem
as a political rather than a policy problem, and acted accordingly--consulting with Congress
instead of with the regional players. Perhaps he figured that the House Democrats were
still in close touch with the region and would represent their interests. If so, ironically he
was right.

U.S. policy may be in the process of a turnaround. But we are still at the stage of
words, not deeds. To understand the extent of the change, let me recall how the previous
administration worked. In fact, Baker told Congressional leaders that one of the Reagan

administration's biggest mistakes was in not embracing Esquipulas 11, the accord concluded
by the Central Americans in August 1987.
At the time the agreement was reached, veteran trouble-shooter Philip Habib, who
was then a special U.S. envoy for Central America, told his boss, Secretary of State George
Shultz that this was a victory for U.S. policy. "We're home free." He said the Guatemala
accord was a great achievement for U.S. policy and U.S. interests, though it would require
some polishing. The idea was with the contras in place around Nicaragua, and the region
eager for a negotiated solution, the United States could test the possibilities for internal
reforms in Nicaragua and resolve the security differences with the Sandinistas. Habib had
proposed visiting the entire region, including Managua. But the hard-liners got to Reagan
first, and he put off a decision. So Habib quit.
Now recall the sequence of events. Far from embracing the peace process, within a
month of Esquipulas 11, George Shultz proposed $270 million in contra aid. And U.S.
military advisers with some skill encouraged the contras to mount major military assaults.
The only thing lacking from an expanded war was Congressional support.
Esquipulas I1 provided an alternative route.

Instead,

The timing of the peace accords, after the

Iran-contra scandal, weakened Reagan's political strength at home, and gave House
Democrats the strength to block any further military aid.
The formula that Habib had favored was to ask for military aid and keep the contras
in place while conducting diplomacy. By early 1989, however, Congress was in no mood
to provide military aid under any circumstances.

Eighteen months later, the problem for Baker in embracing Esquipulas I1 was that you
can't run the film backwards and rewrite the plot.

A secondary problem was that he

couldn't pronounce it.
I

t

The contras left Nicaragua in the second half of 1988. So there was little possibility
of any military leverage.
The regional leaders, impatient for U.S. action, had at Tesoro Beach in February,
made a serious advance on Esquipulas 11, by promising to demobilize and disperse the
contras. The Sandinistas simultaneously agreed to move up elections and hold them under
international monitoring.
So Baker concocted a new approach that for the moment, until proven otherwise,
might be described as a diplomatic approach without direct diplomacy.
Unlike Philip Habib's time, it so far does not involve a special high-profile U.S.
envoy touring the area, just routine contacts. That omission contains a message that we
can guess at, but from the way Baker works, it would be safe to assume that there is,
among other things, a good political reason.

Habib did not leave in good odor among

conservative Republicans.
The Baker initiative also does not involve direct talks with the Sandinistas. Again
one suspects largely domestic political reasons. So far it involves strong rhetorical support
for the Esquipulas I1 process.
Another component is to rhetorically assault the Soviets and Cubans and to demand
they cut aid to the Sandinistas. Baker is most effective when he speaks quietly. So again,
one can suspect that loud rhetoric has a domestic target audience.

Despite the differences, there are some interesting carry-overs from the thrust of the
Reagan administration.
The Baker initiative was put together mainly in the context of the politics at home,
what the traffic would bear, rather than in the context of what really fit in with the dynamic
going on in the region. I am speaking literally about how it came about rather than will
it make good foreign policy.
As already mentioned, no direct talks are foreseen with the Sandinistas for the time
being, and if there are any talks, they will be in a multilateral context. This conforms to
the Reagan approach since early 1985.
The Soviets are verbally assaulted for continuing to support the Sandinistas--a favorite
theme of the Reagan years.
The region is described as highly important for U.S. interests and not at all important
for Soviet interests. Yet other than the rhetoric, there is no definition given to U.S. interests
nor is there much suggestion on how those interests will be upheld. Again vintage Reagan.
Then he approached the European aid donors and before he had any plan formulated
asked them to add a condition to their aid to Nicaragua: not to provide it unless and until
Nicaragua fulfills all its commitments to democratic reforms under Esquipulas. This was
vintage Ronald Reagan and was received as such.
The most regrettable of all the lapses into Reaganism is the lack of definition of
exactly what we want in Nicaragua. What kind of democracy do we expect there? A
Salvador style democracy? A Honduran style? A Costa Rican style? Or American style?
And what is the standard? Who is to judge fulfillment? I asked Brent Scowcroft this a
few weeks ago, and he replied: "good question."

What do these contradictions signify? Either that we have Reagan redux, just more
kind and gentle, and the intention is to avoid biting the bullet. Frankly one must keep
one's mind open to this possibility. Or that the administration is groping without an exact
road map towards something that will help it fulfill its newly stated vision. For the time
being, with all due skepticism, one should consider the latter still a live possibility.
The problem is Ronald Reagan also had a vision. And the way he pursued it was,
to quote James Baker, a failure. How the administration goes about pursuing its latest
vision is important.
Yet there is a vision, It is somewhat vague at the moment. But it is taking shape
at the hands of one of the ablest speech writers to cross the threshold of room 6263, the
office of the assistant secretary for inter-American affairs. Baker said it in Atlanta last
week.
The vision is that "the guns of war can stand silent throughout Central America" so
that "we get on with the urgent work of economic integration and development for which
the people of that war-torn region deeply yearn."

It is to help the debt-ridden Latin

American countries facing the challenge of economic reform, to reduce U.S. trade barriers,
to cut drug demand as well as supplies, to revitalize the collective institutions, and to allow
democracy not only to survive but to prosper.
In the process, the United States wants a partnership based on mutual respect and
shared responsibility. As Baker put it last week, "We really do have a lot to learn from
each other."
Baker's ultimate vision is Bolivar's vision: an entirely democratic hemisphere. Not
so wild a dream if you accept the superficial definition of democracy that Reagan did. Not

a strategy in there, but some goals to be sure. But consider this: the context in which
Baker delivered the remarks was at the Jimmy Carter Center in Atlanta, a Democratic
bastion, as those things go; and it just turned the place upside down.
Now the vision is vague in what it denotes. But what it connotes for the first time
is a sense that there may be a positive linkage between U.S. policy in one part of the
isthmus with another. I am reluctant to predict successes or failures. But I can suggest
some possible spill-overs. For one thing, there might be a spill-over effect onto El Salvador
of a resolution of the Nicaragua issue. Just as Gorbachev has gained authority from the
Afghanistan withdrawal and other unilateral steps, Bush and Baker could gain credibility and
authority by supporting the Central American peace process in Nicaragua. I would take it
a step further, but this would be well down the road. If with skillful diplomacy the Bush
administration can resolve its problems with Nicaragua and later El Salvador, Panama may
in time follow. These issues are interconnected, though in subtle ways. Anyone who has
talked with Noriega knows he has closely watched the U.S. floundering in Nicaragua.
Recall Nicaragua's 1984 elections when hard-liners at the White House like Constantine
Menges blocked Tomris Borge from coming to this country for a get-acquainted trip. We
later knew he wanted to run for president against Daniel Ortega. When I saw Noriega the
following year, he expressed bafflement at U.S. policy. He could not understand why the
United States did not encourage the rivalry between Ortega and Borge.

Undoubtedly,

however, he made good use of his observation in 1987 and 1988 in deciding how to play
off the State Department against the Pentagon.
Regarding the attitude of the various players toward the Cubans and Russians, so far
all we have is a great deal of rhetoric and little substance. We are back, regrettably, to the

emotional language, hype and preemptive public relations of Reagan years--demanding
that the Soviets cut all aid to the Sandinistas and get out of the region because it is our

1

backyard, charging the Sandinistas with subverting El Salvador without providing convincing
evidence, saying the Sandinistas have an army bigger than all the others combined in
Central America, ignoring the actual figures of the IISS. I suspect domestic politics underlie
the campaign of the past week because it sure is no way to get anything done in the real
world. Because the administration has shown a good deal of pragmatism in other areas, I
prefer for the moment to view this campaign as a smoke screen and to reserve judgment
until some patterns emerge.
Since I have put so much stress on the absence of plans for any direct talks with the
Sandinistas about security issues, I will briefly discuss the various available options. Such
talks are inevitable, although I would place no bets on the timing.

This is the test of

seriousness against which the Bush-Baker initiative will ultimately be judged.
The most roundabout way of talking with the Sandinistas is by way of the Russians,
and at that through public exchanges rather than a real serious knocking-together of heads.
Moreover, the United States knows well what the Soviet positions are. Gorbachev has
consistently said that they will negotiate only a global reduction in arms transfers to Central
1

America with the United States, not a trade-off of aid to the contras for aid to the
Sandinistas. Thus they will completely cut military aid to Managua if we do the same in
San Salvador and Tegucigalpa. This makes military containment of the Sandinistas almost
inconceivable and would severely limit the U.S. relationship with other military establishments. There is some debate among experts whether this is a starting position and a deal
is lurking out there somewhere. I suspect no deal is lurking out there and that the Soviets

are simply raising an ante so high as to signal that they are not planning to sell the
Sandinistas down the river any time soon. For reasons I do not understand, Jim Wright has
been pushing this proposal as has, rhetorically, Jim Baker. Of the three possible scenarios,
this would be the least advantageous for U.S. interests. Pressing on with the rhetoric is
quite acceptable in terms of U.S. domestic politics, however.
Honduran foreign minister Carlos U p e z Contreras has proposed a second plan. For
the past year and a half, he has urged direct U.S.-Sandinista talks and offered Honduras as
a location for them. As an alternative, he has offered multilateral talks with Nicaragua on
the elimination of the Cuban presence there. Simultaneously, he would negotiate over the
U.S. presence in Honduras and outside support in El Salvador.

I

This would put U.S.

presence in Honduras on an equal footing with Cuban presence in Nicaragua and result in
the removal of the very sizable U.S. presence in Honduras.

Not a great deal from the

perspective of U.S. interests, but a better one than that offered by the Soviets. Why does
L6pez Contreras offer it? It is a subtle way of highlighting the conclusion that there is
no substitute for direct talks.
The third proposal is that of Nicaragua itself.

It is willing in exchange for a

commitment to nonaggression and normalization by the United States to commit to negotiate
an end to Cuban presence in Nicaragua, limits on new arms types and prohibition of Soviet
bases.

No word about the U.S. presence in third countries.

It clearly is the least

disadvantageous approach from the perspective of U.S. interests, but perhaps the least
attractive in terms of domestic politics.
Are U.S. security interests important, or is it just a matter of rhetoric? That remains
to be seen.

